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The outlook for Europe's external relations has never looked so uncertain in the postcold war era. A series of internal and external shocks have shaken the EU to its foundations. Internally, the global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis have caused severe economic dislocation. Europe's single currency, once hailed as the pinnacle of European integration, is now regarded by many as an economic liability and a potential source of future disintegration. The EU may have so far managed to avoid the breakup of the Eurozone, but the UK's referendum vote in favour of exiting the EU ('Brexit') has revealed just how fragile Europe's project of 'ever closer union' has become. After successive rounds of EU enlargement, the Union is facing for the first time in its history the prospect of losing a member state. Externally, widening tensions in the Middle East, civil war in Syria, the Ukraine crisis and the rise of a revisionist Russia have undermined the EU's long-standing desire to create a ring of stable neighbouring countries on its southern and eastern flank. The change in perceptions of Europe's strategic position could hardly have been more dramatic. Just over a decade ago, some analysts speculated about the European Dream 'quietly eclipsing the American Dream' (Rifkin 2004 ) and the EU emerging as the 'next superpower' that will shape the global order in the twenty-first century (Leonard 2005) . In contrast, more recent assessments of Europe's economic and political model provide a decidedly gloomier outlook (Merritt 2016; Gillingham 2016; Rachman 2016) . The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are widely seen as 'real threats to the Union's long-standing objective of facilitating a zone of peace, stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood ' (Mueller 2016, 359) , with many analysts declaring the European Neighbourhood Policy 'dead' (Tocci 2014) . To make matters worse, European leaders are found to be lacking in strategic foresight and unable to forge a common position. As Howorth and Menon argue, European policy-makers and commentators have largely engaged in a display of collective hand wringing rather than a process of strategic reflection. At the heart of the problem is the reluctance particularly of larger European states to confront the fact that their individual ability to address the various challenges facing them is diminishing. The challenges posed by today's world require a coherent collective European response ' (2015, 11) .
Against this backdrop of external insecurity and global power shifts abroad, and institutional crisis and strategic drift at home, this special issue takes stock of A second line of research has focused on the empirical study of external perceptions of the EU in global affairs. Rather than study European understandings of the EU's values and interests in a global context and how these are pursued internationally, this research has sought to examine how 'images of the EU vary depending on the issue at hand and across regions' (Chaban et al. 2013, 433) . Several research teams have undertaking comparative studies that survey external perceptions (Lucarelli 2007; Chaban and Holland 2008; Chaban et al. 2009; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010) . Usually based on elite interviews (Chaban et al. 2013) or discourse analysis (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010) , researchers in this tradition have highlighted that perceptions of EU leadership and power are 'highly issue-specific'
and also vary from region to region (Chaban et al. 2013, 446-7) . They also demonstrate that the established representation of the EU as a different international actor that transcends more conventional interest calculations are not matched by outside perceptions (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010, 222-3) .
A third line of enquiry has produced a more fundamental challenge to the established 'inside-out' framing of EU external relations and has called for a radical ). However, in an international system that is transitioning from US dominance and unipolarity towards multipolarity and great power rivalry, and that is characterized by a more fractured and regionalized security environment, new questions about the EU's actorness are bound to arise.
The inside-out perspective has also been dominant in the other major scholarly debate on Europe's international role, which accepts that the EU has gained certain actor-type qualities but is focused on its identity as an international actor, the interests that it pursues and the types of instruments that it uses to achieve its objectives. This debate is organised around the claim that the EU is a different kind of international actor, a 'normative power' (Manners 2002 ) that seeks to shape international order in ways that set it apart from conventional powers in international society. Proponents of the normative power thesis argue that the EU is not aspiring to become a 'normal' great power but is instead seeking to promote a distinctive set of values and interests that are universal in nature (Manners 2006, 176) . Being a post-Westphalian actor that has transcended the zero-sum logic of power politics, the EU pursues a different global order policy: working through 'ideas, opinions and conscience' (Diez and Manners 2007, 175) , its diplomatic efforts are directed towards "the promotion and maintenance of negotiated order as a key approach to global governance" (Smith 2013 ) and the 'strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan law, emphasising the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states to sovereign equality' (Sjursen, 2006: 249) .
12
The normative power argument has been criticised from several different angles: Sjursen (2006) points to conceptual weaknesses, particularly with regard to the criteria and assessment standards for distinguishing normative from other forms of power. Bicchi (2006) (Manners, 2002, p. 252 That the EU's capacity to define and pursue foreign policy objectives has always been constrained is well understood in the research literature. From its early stages of development until today, the EU has been described as an incomplete power that lacks certain essential foreign policy instruments, such as independent military strength (Bull 1982) , or as an emerging power that is held back by a gap between unrealistic expectations and insufficient capabilities (Hill 1993) . Much has been made of the fact that EU foreign policy is only as good as the EU's member states allow it to be. To be sure, considerable progress has been made in establishing an institutional framework for a common EU-wide foreign policy, from the Common Foreign and The UK's EU referendum vote in June 2016 revealed just how damaging the rise of nationalist populism can be to European integration. The UK referendum result represents a decisive turning-point not only in British politics but potentially also in the history of European integration. While the outcome of the Brexit negotiations will not be known for some time, the threat of further exits from the EU has become more tangible. Of course, it is possible that the departure of a country that used to be described as Europe's 'awkward' partner may yet reinvigorate the push for closer cooperation and integration among the EU-27 Salter 2006, 1318) . But a more likely, and worrying, outlook is for anti-European populism to gather strength across the continent and undermine efforts for a strengthening of EU-level decisionmaking, including in foreign policy.
In the context of these external and internal challenges, the question of In the second contribution on the EU's new global strategy, Karen Smith offers a critical assessment of the EUGS and asks whether it deserves the label of a strategy and how well it responds to newly emerging international challenges. Smith opens her analysis with a brief discussion of the essence of strategic thinking in international relations, which can be summed up as an attempt to combine foreign policy ends, ways and means. Based on this understanding of strategy, Europe's past attempts at developing strategic documents, including for EU foreign policy, are found wanting. Smith argues that the EUGS itself represents a significant step forward in that it provides a more 'realist' guide for EU foreign and security policy in the near future. However, the author warns against hubristic optimism. Continuing internal divisions, combined with the UK's decision to seek an exit from the EU, pose severe challenges for the implementation of Europe's new strategy in an increasingly hostile international environment.
In the final contribution to this special issue, Tim Oliver examines Britain's referendum vote in favour of exiting the EU and the implications of a future Brexit for UK-European relations. As Oliver points out, resolving the question of how Britain can leave the EU involves not just one bilateral UK-EU negotiation but fourteen different sets of discussions and negotiations within the UK (about the respective powers and policies of the constituent parts of the UK political system), within the EU (about new balances of power between EU institutions and about the EU's future external relations) and between the UK and EU (about EU withdrawal, transitional arrangements and future relationships). Rather than focusing on the inside perspective of the Brexit negotiations, Oliver argues that we need to pay closer attention to how the UK-EU relationship is interpreted by international actors (esp. USA, Russia, China) and how Brexit may alter those external perceptions. Such an outside-in perspective is needed to understand how major powers' perceptions set the context in which new UK-EU relationships will emerge in the post-Brexit era.
